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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
Case No. 970390-CA
vs.
TRAVIS BEN HARDING,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.

JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has appellate jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Annotated Section
78-2a-3(2) (e) .

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court erred under Rules 404(b) and

403 in allowing the introduction of evidence concerning the
arrest warrant and Harding's post-arrest statements concerning
other drug deals?
"The admission of evidence under Rule 404 is a question of
law that we review for correctness.

However, the trial court's

subsidiary factual determinations should be given deference by
the appellate court and only be overruled if they are clearly
erroneous."

State v. Olsen, 869 P.2d 1004, 1009 (Utah App. 1994)

(citations omitted).

The standard of review for decisions under

1

Rule 403 is as follows: "When reviewing a trial court's decision
to admit evidence under Rule 403, we assess

whether, as a matter

of law, the trial court acted reasonably in striking the balance"
between the probative value of the evidence against its potential
for unfair prejudice.

State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 694, 699 n.5

(Utah App.), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 (Utah 1993).
This issue was preserved in a pre-trial motion and again at
trial (R. 45-51; Tr. at 192-93).

CONTROLLING STATUTORY PROVISIONS
RULE 403, UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
RULE 404(b), UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not
admissible to prove the character of a person in order to
show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity,
or absence of mistake or accident. In other words evidence
offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant for
a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules
402 and 403.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
Travis Ben Harding appeals from the judgment, sentence and

order of Probation by the Honorable Ray M. Harding on May 23,
1997, after a jury trial at which Harding was convicted of
Possession of a Controlled Substance in a Drug Free Zone, a
second degree felony.
B.

Trial Court Proceedings and Disposition
Harding was charged by information filed on or about

November 18, 1996, with Possession of Methamphetamine in a Drug
Free Zone, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code
Annotated Section 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) (R. 1 ) .
Prior to trial, Harding filed, pursuant to Rules 403 and
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, a Motion in Limine to
exclude evidence of Harding's prior convictions, evidence of the
arrest warrant which led to this charge, and Harding's postarrest statements (R. 45-51).

On April 9, 1997, Judge Harding

issued a memorandum decision in which he granted Harding's motion
with respect to evidence of prior criminal behavior except to
impeach specific statements by Harding should he testify at trial
(R. 54-55).

The trial court denied Harding's motion as to his

post-arrest statements and to evidence regarding the outstanding
warrants which resulted in Harding's arrest and this drug charge
(R. 54-55).
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On April 10, 1997, a jury trial was held and Harding was
convicted as charged (R. 117-119).

On May 23, 1997, Judge Ray M.

Harding sentenced Harding to thirty-six months probation and
ordered him to serve 270 days in the Utah County Jail and to pay
a fine/surcharge of $1,850.00 (R. 124-25).
On June 23, 1997, Harding filed a Notice of Appeal with the
Fourth District Court and this action followed (R. 127).

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
On October 24, 1996, Clark J. Nielsen, a detective with the
Pleasant Grove Police Department, served an arrest warrant on the
Defendant, Travis Harding/Travis Martin at Rick's Auto (Tr. at
186-88).

Nielsen hand-cuffed Harding and transported him to the

Pleasant Grove Police Department where Harding was instructed to
remove his personal property from his clothing (Tr. at 189-90).
Harding emptied out the pocket in his coat and removed a
pack of cigarettes and a small plastic bag that contained "a
white powder substance" inside (Tr. at 190-91).

Nielsen

testified that as Harding removed items from the coat pocket, he
appeared to be "concealing something or attempting to" (Tr. at
190).

Nielsen also testified that he did not notice the bag

initially, but saw it only after moving the cigarettes (Id.).
Nielsen asked Harding what the bag was and Harding replied that
"he didn't know" (Id.).

Later Harding told Nielsen that the
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baggie was placed in the coat by his girlfriend, Gina Thayer (Tr.
at 211).

Still later, a female called Nielsen and indicated to

him that the baggie was not Harding's (Tr. at 211-12).

Nielsen

testified that field tests indicated that the powder substance
coating the lining of the bag with a more detectable amount at
its bottom was methamphetamine (Tr. at 191-92, 205) .
Nielsen testified that Harding "became very emotional" when
the substance tested positive for methamphetamine (Tr. at 192).
Harding told Nielsen that "he didn't want to go to jail.

He said

that he would work with me..." (Tr. at 193). Nielsen testified
that Harding also told him that "he knew of a lot of different
illegal activity, stolen guns and drugs, that he was very aware
of or had knowledge of that he could hook me up with so that I
could give him a break on the criminal charges, because he didn't
want to go to jail" (Tr. at 193). 1

Harding was then transported

to the Utah County Jail for the arrest warrant (Tr. at 193).
Nielsen also testified that he was informed by Harding that
papers and the cigarettes that were found in the coat pocket
belonged to Harding's girlfriend, Gina Thayer (Tr. at 208-09).
Harding also indicated to Nielsen that he smoked one brand of
cigarette's and Thayer smoked a different brand (Tr. at 211).

Warding renewed his objection to the introduction of these
statements under Rule 404(b) and was overruled.
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Nielsen testified that there was nothing about Harding's
appearance or behavior that would cause him to believe that
Harding was under the influence of narcotics at the time of his
arrest (Tr. at 216) .
Jennifer McNair, an employee at the State Crime Laboratory,
testified that she analyzed the powdered substance removed from
Harding's coat for the Pleasant Grove Police Department (Tr. at
230-31).

McNair testified that she performed four tests on the

substance and identified it as amphetamine and methamphetamine
(Tr. at 232). McNair described the amount in the bag as "a
minimal residue" (Tr. at 239, 240).
Harding testified his birth name is Travis Ben Martin, but
that he has been known has Travis Ben Harding his entire life
because his mother married Mark Harding when she was pregnant
with him (Tr. at 246). Harding testified that Thayer has been
his common-law wife for ten years and that they have four
children together (Tr. at 247) .
On October 24, 1996, Harding, Thayer and one of their
children were residing with Harding's grandmother, Addie Roundy,
in Pleasant Grove (Tr. at 248). Harding testified that the
leather coat he was wearing on October 24, 1996, when arrested at
Rick's Auto initially belonged to him, but that he had given it
to Thayer three weeks earlier (Tr. at 248-49).
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Harding testified that earlier on October 24, 1996, Thayer
wore the coat out on errands with Harding's grandmother (Tr. at
249-50).

While they were gone, Harding received a telephone call

from Rick's Auto about his car which was being repaired (Tr. at
250).

When the ladies returned, Harding's grandfather drove

Harding to Rick's Auto (Tr. at 250-51).

Before leaving the

house, Harding saw the coat hanging in the kitchen and put it on
(Tr. at 251).
While at Rick's Auto, Harding was approached by Detective
Nielsen and placed in handcuffs (Tr. at 252). Nielsen then
started asking Harding about the car and asked him about a
fraudulent inspection (Id.).

Harding testified that he was then

frisked by Nielsen, who pulled articles—including cigarettes the
plastic bag—out of his pocket (Tr. at 253-54).

Harding told

Nielsen that he did not know what was in the bag (Tr. at 254).
Nielsen then removed two knives from Harding's person (Id.).
Harding testified that his cigarettes and lighter were in his
back pocket and Thayer's cigarettes were in the same pocket as
the baggie (Tr. at 255).
Harding testified that at the Pleasant Grove Police
Department, he did not attempt to hide the baggie (Tr. at 257).
Harding testified that he did not know that the baggie was in the
coat pocket prior to the time that he went to Rick's Auto (Id.).
Harding testified that he saw no loose particles in the baggie
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that appeared to be powder; and that he told Nielsen that the
baggie was not his (Tr. at 257-58).

Finally, Harding testified

that he did not know that he had methamphetamine residue under
his control at the time he was arrested and that he believed that
the baggie was a "wrapper with mud on it" (Tr. at 259, 273).
Andie Roundy, Harding's grandmother, testified that on
October 24, 1996, she went with Thayer on some errands to get a
birth certificate for Harding and Thayer's daughter (Tr. at 281).
Roundy testified that Thayer was wearing a dark leather coat
which she had been wearing on a regular basis although it
belonged to Harding (Tr. at 282).

Roundy testified that Thayer

had some papers and her brand of cigarettes in the coat pocket
(Tr. at 283).
After returning from errands, Roundy testified that Thayer
took off the coat and hung it on a chair by the door in the
kitchen (Tr. at 284).

Shortly afterwards, Harding picked-up the

coat and wore it to go with her husband to Rick's Auto (Tr. at
284).

When Harding returned, he told Roundy and Thayer what

happened and gave Thayer her cigarettes and papers (Tr. at 285).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court erred in admitting evidence of the arrest
warrant and Harding's post-arrest statements concerning other
"illegal activity" under Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the Utah
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Rules of Evidence.

Under either rule, any probative effect of

this evidence is outweighed by its prejudicial effect on
Harding's credibility and its rousing the jury to overmastering
hostility towards Harding.

Absent the introduction of such

evidence, there was a reasonable likelihood that Harding would be
acquitted.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING THE ADMISSION
OF EVIDENCE AS TO THE ARREST WARRANT AND HARDING'S
POST-ARREST STATEMENTS CONCERNING OTHER ILLEGAL ACTIVITY
UNDER RULES 404(b) AND 403
Prior to trial, Harding filed a Motion in Limine to exclude
the admission of evidence concerning the arrest warrant which led
to the drug charge at issue here as well as Hardingfs post-arrest
statements concerning other illegal activity2 (R. 45-51).

The

trial court denied Harding's motion with regards to both the
arrest warrant and Harding1s post-arrest statements (R. 54-55).
The trial court concluded that Harding's post-arrest statements
"are probative as to his intent to commit the crime charged...
2

0fficer Nielsen initially came in contact with Harding because
of an arrest warrant. After the contents of the plastic bag which
was found in the pocket of Harding's coat field tested positive for
methamphetamine, Harding indicated to Nielsen that "he didn't want
to go to jail.
He said that he would work with me. . /' (Tr. at
Nx
193) ; and that he knew of a lot of different illegal activity,
stolen guns and drugs... that he could hook me up with so that I
could give him a break on the criminal charges..." (Tr. at 193).
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[and that] the probative value of the statements outweighs any
danger of unfair prejudice" (R. 54).

Harding asserts that the

trial court erred in admitting this evidence under both Rule
404(b) and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

A.

The trial court erred in admitting evidence of the arrest
warrant and Harding's post-arrest statements under Rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence, addresses the

admissibility of evidence of prior bad acts: "Evidence of other
crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character
of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.

It

may, however, be admissible for other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, or absence of mistake or accident.

In other words

evidence offered under this rule is admissible if it is relevant
for a non-character purpose and meets the requirements of Rules
402 and 403."3
"The basis of these limitations on the admissibility of
evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a fact finder to
convict the accused because of bad character rather than because
he is shown to be guilty of the offenses charged."

3

State v.

The last sentence of this rule was added in 1998 with the
comment that it "abandons the additional requirements for admitting
evidence under Rule 404(b) imposed by State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d
484 (Utah 1997)."
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Saunders, 699 P.2d 738, 741 (Utah 1985).

Moreover, evidence of

other crimes committed by the defendant "is not admissible if the
purpose is to disgrace the defendant as a person of evil
character with a propensity to commit crime."

State v. Daniels,

584 P.2d 880, 881 (Utah 1978).
The trial court erred in allowing the introduction of the
arrest warrant.

There was no necessity for the evidence.

It was

not probative of a material issue of possession of a controlled
substance.

The warrant was not proof of "motive, opportunity,

intent, preparation, plan, knowledge [or] identity." Harding's
credibility was critical with respect to the element of knowledge
and intent.

The fact that he was wanted for other criminal acts

prejudiced his credibility with the jury.
Similarly, the trial court erred in allowing the admission
of Harding's post-arrest statements concerning other "illegal
activity, stolen guns and drugs" (Tr. at 193).

Contrary to the

trial court's decision, Harding's statements were not "highly
probative of" the element of intent.

They simply demonstrated

Harding's shock at the discovery of the methamphetamine and his
natural desire to avoid incarceration.

The admission of the

statements could only inflame the jury's prejudice against
Harding by causing the jury to believe that Harding knew and
associated with drug dealers on a regular basis.
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Accordingly, because of the prejudice suffered by Harding
because of the admission of this evidence, and because neither
the warrant or Harding's statements were "highly probative of a
material issue", Harding asks that this Court reverse the
decision of the trial court to admit this evidence under Rule
404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence.

B.

The trial court erred in admitting evidence of other illegal
activity under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence.
Should this Court find that Harding's post-arrest statements

concerning his ability to supply the police with information of
other "illegal activity" does not qualify as evidence of other
bad acts under Rule 404 (b), or should this Court conclude that
evidence of the arrest warrant and Harding's post-arrest
statement are admissible under Rule 404(b), the evidence still
should have been excluded under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence.
Rule 403 reads: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded
if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or
needless presentation of cumulative evidence."

This Court

reviews a decision to admit evidence under Rule 403 under an
"abuse of discretion" standard.

State v. O'Neil, 848 P.2d 698,

699 n.5 (Utah App. 1993), cert, denied, 859 P.2d 585 ("We assess
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whether, as a matter of law, the trial court acted reasonably in
striking the balance" between probativeness and prejudice).
In relation to the issue of prejudice, this Court has
stated, ''Evidence is unfairly prejudicial if it has a tendency to
influence the outcome of the trial by improper means or if it
appeals to the juries sympathies or arouses its sense of horror,
provokes its instinct to punish or otherwise cause a jury to base
its decision on something other than the established propositions
of the case."

State v. Burk, 839 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah App. 1992),

cert, denied, 853 P.2d 897 (Utah 1993).
Factors to be considered "when a court balances the
probativeness of evidence against its prejudicial effect" include
"the need for the evidence" and "the degree to which the evidence
probably will rouse the jury to overmastering hostility."
O'Neil, 848 P.2d at 701 (quoting State v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291,
296 (Utah 1988)).
In this case, the State had no need for the admission of the
arrest warrant or Harding's post-arrest statements concerning his
desire to work with the police in exchange for leniency.

The

trial court gave no reason for the admission of the arrest
warrant and the trial court erred in finding the post-arrest
statement to be probative of intent.

Moreover, the trial court

did not balance the admissibility of such evidence under Rule
404(b) with its possible prejudice as required by Rule 403.
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Any probative value of the statements was clearly outweighed
by their prejudicial effect.

Harding's credibility as to the

element of knowledge/intent was central to the outcome in this
case.

The introduction of evidence which illustrated that

Harding had past convictions and that he was well-acquainted with
drug and gun dealers could only damage his credibility with the
jury and "rouse the jury to overmastering hostility" against him.
Accordingly, Harding asserts that the trial court committed
reversible error in admitting evidence of the arrest warrant and
Harding's post-arrest statements under Rule 403 of the Utah Rules
of Evidence.

CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT
Harding respectfully asks that this Court conclude that the
trial court erred in admitting evidence of the arrest warrant and
Harding's post-arrest statements of other "illegal activity"
under both Rule 404(b) and Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of
Evidence. Therefore, Harding asks that this Court reverse the
trial court and remand this matter to the Fourth District for new
proceedings.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

PJ>

day of May, 1998.

Ma]
argaret/

P. Lindsay
Counsel for Harding
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I hereby certify that I delivered two (2) true and correct
copies of the foregoing Brief Of Appellant to the Appeals
Division, Utah Attorney General, 160 East 300 South, Sixth Floor,
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December, 1997.
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FOURTH1JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR i
OF UTA -''--'
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APR

71997

CARMAd. SMITH, CLERK
DEPUTY

Christine L. Sagendorf (7612)
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION
Attorney for Defendant
40 South 100 West Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: 379-2570
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
CONVICTIONS, ARREST ON AN
OUTSTANDING WARRANT, AND
STATEMENTS MADE AFTER ARREST

Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 961401599
TRAVIS BEN HARDING,
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING, SR.
Defendant.

COMES NOW, the Defendant above named, by and through his counsel of record, CHRISTINE
L. SAGENDORF, and hereby moves this court In Limine pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure to exclude evidence regarding the Defendant's prior criminal history, evidence
regarding the warrant on which his arrest was effected, and evidence of Defendant's post-arrest
statements.
Respectfully submitted this

*\

day of April, 1997.

^CjteQSTINE IT. SAGENDORF
Attorney for Defendant
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Motion in
Limine to Exclude Evidence of Prior Convictions to C. Kay Bryson, 100 East Center, Suite 2100, Provo,
UT 84606, this
day of April, 1997.
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Fourth Jud.cia- Oistri6t l Cour
of Utah County. State o t U U n

C A R M A B. S M I T H , C l e r k
Deputy
Christine L. Sagendorf (7612)
UTAH COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS ASSOCIATION
Attorney for Defendant
40 South 100 West Suite 200
Provo, Utah 84601
Telephone: 379-2570
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, UTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND
AUTHORITIES IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION IN LIMINE TO EXCLUDE
EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S PRIOR
CONVICTIONS, ARREST ON AN
OUTSTANDING WARRANT, AND
STATEMENTS MADE AFTER ARREST

Plaintiff,

vs.
Case No. 961401599
TRAVIS BEN HARDING,
JUDGE RAY M. HARDING, SR.
Defendant.

The Defendant above named, pursuant to Rule 12 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure,
hereby submits the following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant's Motion
in Limine to Exclude Evidence.

STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
*•
Dr

The defendant, TRAVIS BEN HARDING, is charged with Possession of Methamphetamine in a

ug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony, resulting from allegations of the 24th day of October, 1996
Defendant was arraigned and entered a Not Guilty plea before the Honorable Judge Lynn W.

D

avis on the 14th day of March, 1997.
Trial by jury is scheduled for the 10th day of April, 1997.

005i

4.

Mr. Harding has one felony conviction for Possession of a Controlled Substance, a third degree

felony. This judgment was entered by Judge Cullen Christensen on December 22, 1989. He also appears
to have several misdemeanor convictions. Those convictions include: one count of Possession or Use of
a Controlled Substance, a class B misdemeanor, on November 17, 1989; two counts of Attempted
Aggravated Assault, both class A misdemeanors, on March 29, 1991; and one count of Assault on a
Peace Officer, a class A misdemeanor, together with one count of Criminal Trespass, a class C
misdemeanor, on June 7, 1994. One of the aforementioned assault charges was also prosecuted by the
Federal Government and Mr. Harding was sentenced to Federal Prison pursuant to that charge.
5.

Mr. Harding was taken into custody on October 24, 1996 on a warrant out of Pleasant Grove

which is unrelated to the present controversy. At the time he was booked, Mr. Harding made several
statements to his arresting officer regarding contacts he had with drug suppliers and a theft ring.
ARGUMENT

I.
EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO PRIOR ACTS BY THE DEFENDANT ARE
INADMISSIBLE UNDER UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 404(b) AND 403.
The Utah Court of Appeals has outlined the analysis in determining the admissibility of evidence
of prior crimes, wrongs, or actions. First, the evidence must be admissible under Utah Rules of Evidence
404(b). If the evidence is not admissible under that rule, the inquiry ends. On the other hand, if the
evidence of prior conviction qualifies under 404(b), the court must then turn its analysis to whether the
effect of admission would be more prejudicial than probative under Utah Rules of Evidence 403. State v.
ONeiL 848 P.2d 694 (Utah App. 1993).
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Utah Rules of Evidence 404(b) provides as follows:
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a
person in order to show action in conformity therewith. It may, however, be admissible
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 404(b).
The Utah Court of Appeals has interpreted this section to mean that: "Rule 404(b) does not
exclude evidence unless it fits an exception; rather, it allows admission of relevant evidence 'other than to
show merely the general disposition of the defendant1". State v. Taylor, 818 P.2d 561 (Utah App. 1991)
quoting State v. Jamison, 767 P.2d 134 (Utah App. 1989). Although motive, intent, preparation, plan,
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident often provide the state with arguments for
admission of evidence of prior actions, the relevancy of such evidence must go beyond a general attack of
the defendant. The application of rule 404(b) makes clear that evidence of prior actions must be relevant
as to the proof of an element of the crime charged to be admissible. "In sum, 'when evidence may
establish constitutive elements of the crime of which the defendant is accused, in the case on trial, it is
admissible even though it tends to prove that the defendant has committed other crimes." Taylor at 569.
The Court in State v. Shickles held as follows:
The general rule prohibiting evidence that a defendant committed other crimes was
established, not because that evidence is logically irrelevant, but because it tends to skew
or corrupt the accuracy of the fact-finding process. Indeed, Dean Wigmore has argued,
"It is objectionable not because it has no appreciable probative value but because it has too
much." [Citations omitted.] Thus evidence of other crimes is generally inadmissible unless
it tends to have a special relevance to a controverted issue and is introduced for a purpose
other than to show the defendant's predisposition to criminality.
Shickles 760 P.2d 291, 295 (Utah 1988), quoting 1A J. Wigmore, Evidence in Trials at Common Law
§58.2 at 1212 (Tillers rev. 1983).
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The Defendant asserts that evidence of his prior convictions, the fact that he was arrested on an
outstanding warrant, and his post-arrest statements do not fall into one of the exceptions to 404(b). If
404(b) does not provide for admission of the evidence, the inquiry concludes and the evidence is not
admitted. However, if this Court determines that the evidence is admissible under that section, the
analysis turns to Rule 403. Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence provides that even if the Court finds
that the evidence of another crime meets any of the criteria enumerated in 404(b) it may still be excluded.
Rule 403 reads as follows:
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the
jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence.
Utah Rules of Evidence Rule 403.
Defendant asserts that evidence of his prior convictions, the outstanding warrant on which his
arrest was effected, and his post-arrest statements offer nothing in the way of evidence as to any element
of the case before this Court. Consequently, the only possible value of evidence of prior convictions is to
prejudice the defendant in the eyes of the jury. Absent any probative value, any prejudicial impact at all is
sufficient to prevent admission of the evidence.
In interpreting Rule 403, the court in State v. Saunders. 699 P.2d 738, 741 (1985), said
"Evidence of prior crimes is presumed prejudicial..." The Court has further said, "Trial court's
admission of a prior conviction because it was of sufficient probative value was improper because this
rule requires the trial court to balance the probative value of the evidence against the prejudicial effect."
Neither the Defendant's prior history nor any statements he made regarding those involvements serves to
further a critical or material element of the crime charged. That being the case, the prejudicial effect
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clearly outweighs any probative value and the evidence ought to be excluded for consideration by the
jury.
II.
EVIDENCE OF OR REFERENCE TO PRIOR CONVICTIONS OF THE DEFENDANT
ARE INADMISSIBLE UNDER UTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 609.
The defense also requests that the Defendant be allowed to testify in this matter without threat
that evidence of prior actions being used to impeach his testimony. Defendant asserts that the reasoning
for making the admissibility of another criminal convictions, as related in the previous section, so difficult
is in deference to the defendant's constitutional rights. The Utah Constitution provides as follows:
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appeal and defend in person
and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him, to have a
copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to have a speedy public t r i a l . . . .
Utah Const. Art. I, § 12. (emphasis added).
Defendant asserts that in order for another conviction to be admissible if the defendant elects to
testify, the court must, under Rule 609, begin with the presumption that such information is more
prejudicial than probative, and then the court must find that "the probative value of admitting this
evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect on the accused." Utah Rule of Evidence 403. "The basis of
these limitations on the admissibility of evidence of prior crimes is the tendency of a fact finder to convict
the accused because of bad character rather than because he is shown to be guilty of the offenses
charged." Saunders 699 P.2d at 741. Consequently, ". . . absent a reason for the admission of the
evidence, other than to show criminal disposition, the evidence is excluded." Saunders 699 P.2d at 741.
Allowing evidence of prior bad acts to be admitted even for the limited purpose of challenging
credibility presumes that anyone convicted of a criminal offense is less than trustworthy and chills the
constitutional mandate that a criminal defendant may testify in his own behalf. A defendant faced with

«
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addressing prior convictions and other past actions may well choose to forego testimony in order to
insure that prejudicial evidence will not go to the jury. In so choosing, he is being denied a constitutional
imperative even if he is the one exercising the choice.

m.

CONCLUSION
In the instant case, the State will almost certainly seek to impeach the Defendant based upon his

prior wrongs through admission of evidence regarding Defendant's criminal history, the warrant for his
arrest, and through statements made to the arresting officer during the booking process. This evidence
does not go to any element of the charged crime. Rather, it would be useful only to attack the Defendant
generally and prejudice him in the eyes of the factfinder. Under the appropriate balancing test of Rules
404(b) and 403, the evidence is clearly more prejudicial than probative.
Based upon the foregoing, the Defendant moves the Court to rule that evidence of his prior
criminal convictions, his arrest warrant, and his post-arrest statements is inadmissible.

Respectfully submitted this ^i

day of April, 1994.

CFHUSTINE L. SACgNDORF
Attorney for Defendant
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MEMORANDUM DECISION

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff,

CASE NO. 961401599
DATE: April 9, 1997

vs

JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING
TRAVIS BEN HARDING,
Defendant.

LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder

This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion in Limine. Having
received and considered the Motion, together with memoranda in support of the Motion, the
Court hereby grants in part and denies in part the Motion and delivers the following
Memorandum Decision.
Statement of Facts
The defendant, Travis Ben Harding, is charged with Possession of
Methamphetamine in a Drug Free Zone, a Second Degree Felony and is set for trial before
this Court on April 10, 1997. The Defendant has an extensive criminal history, including
prior convictions for Possession of a Controlled Substance, Attempted Aggravated Assault,
Assault on a Peace Officer, and Criminal Trespass. The Defendant has served time on these
convictions in the Utah County Jail, as well as a federal prison in Arizona.
When the Defendant was taken into custody on October 24, 1996, he made
statements to the arresting officer about his involvement and contacts with drug suppliers and
a theft ring. The Defendant now requests this Court prohibit the use of these prior
convictions and statements in the jury trial set for April 10.

0055

Opinion of the Court
The Court agrees with the Defendant's assertion of Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of
Evidence and will not allow any evidence of prior criminal behavior or convictions as
character evidence to prove conformity therewith in the State's case in chief. The Court will
also not allow any references to prior crimes for general impeachment purposes. However,
the Court will allow the State to address the Defendant's prior criminal history to impeach
specific statements of the Defendant should he choose to testify in his own behalf. In
particular, should the Defendant testify that he has no knowledge of or involvement in drugs,
the Court will allow evidence of his prior conviction to be introduced and the Defendant may
be questioned about prior drug convictions on cross-examination.
The Court denies the Defendant's motion as to the statements made to the arresting
officer on October 24, 1996. An essential element of the offense of possession of
methamphetamines is intent.

The Court finds that the Defendant's statements are probative

as to his intent to commit the crime charged. In addition, the Court finds that the probative
value of the statements outweighs any danger of unfair prejudice. Evidence regarding
outstanding warrants that resulted in the Defendant being in custody will be admitted relative
to the statements made to the arresting officer.
Order
The Court hereby grants the Defendant's Motion in Limine with respect to evidence
of prior crimes offered for general impeachment purposes. The Court denies the Defendant's
Motion with respect to evidence of prior crimes offered for specific impeachment purposes,
and with respect to statements by the Defendant to the arresting officer.
DATED this 9th day of April, 1997.

